



THE AMERICAN FAMILY SURVEY

2019 Summary Report: Trends, Knowledge, and Family Leave Policy

Christopher F. Karpowitz & Jeremy C. Pope

Co-Directors of the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy

Project Committee: Doug Wilks (Editor, *Deseret News*), Christopher F. Karpowitz, Allison Pond (Independent Project Manager), Jeremy C. Pope, and Jesse Hyde (InDepth Editor, *Deseret News*)

We thank Margaret Jarvis and Alex Bass for excellent research assistance.

We are deeply grateful for the efforts and advice of our advisory committee, Karlyn Bowman (American Enterprise Institute), Marcy Carlson (University of Wisconsin), Sara McLanahan (Princeton University), Richard Reeves (The Brookings Institution), and Brad Wilcox (AEI and The University of Virginia). Their advice dramatically improved the survey questionnaire and informed the report. Errors, of course, are our own.



DeseretNews.

YouGov

Contents

1	Project Overview & Summary	3
2	The State of Marriage and Family	6
2.1	Evaluations of Marriage	8
2.2	Evaluations of the Family	10
2.3	The Practice of Family Life in America	11
2.4	The Most Important Problems Facing Families	12
3	Knowledge of Family Trends in America	14
4	Family Leave Policy	19
4.1	Experiences with Family Leave	19
4.2	Attitudes about Family Leave	24
4.3	Support for Family Leave Policies	27
5	Conclusions	31
6	Appendix: Statement on Methodology	33
7	Appendix: Topline Report	33

1 Project Overview & Summary

When we first embarked on the American Family Survey in 2015, our goal was to measure three key concepts: attitudes and practices about marriage and families; policy and political attitudes, mostly about family-related areas; and the stability and structure of respondent families. For the last five years, the survey has identified strong agreement about the social goods of marriage and family while also documenting divergent understandings of the social meaning of marriage and delving into the experience of American families with technology, healthcare, substance abuse, economic challenges, and other areas of concern.

The 2019 American Family Survey marks the fifth year of this study, and we've taken that opportunity to update trends of core questions that speak to the public's faith in the family as an institution (as well as their own marriages and families). Our aim was to mark both stability and change in the first five years of the survey. To what extent are attitudes about families holding steady and to what extent are they changing?

We also tested Americans' knowledge of demographic trends pertaining to families in the U.S. How much does the public know about the facts of relationship and family life in the nation today? Are Americans aware of current patterns in the divorce rate, births that occur outside of marriage, and other facts? And how is their knowledge (or lack of knowledge) related to their views about the health of American families?

Finally, we took a deep dive on the issue of family leave policy, including both the public's personal experience and its opinions about policy proposals currently under consideration in Congress. What are Americans' experiences with time off of work for family-related issues, and what are the public's preferences about current public policy proposals related to paid family leave? This is an area where high-quality surveys of public opinion are lacking, so we know little about what the public thinks about when paid family leave should be available and how such leave should be paid for.

Here are the key findings in each of these areas:

Trends in Attitudes about Marriage and Family

The broad contours of family life and relationship status remain the same as in previous years. Just under half of the adult public is married, though this varies somewhat by demographic group. For instance, more Republicans are married than are independents and Democrats.

We continue to see a pattern of economic and social status relating to marriage. The wealthy and the educated marry more easily — about six in ten of those making about \$40,000 a year are married. However, the number falls to only three in ten of those making below that amount of money. There are racial and education patterns that are similar (with no doubt that all of these are intercorrelated in various ways).

The public tends to believe that marriage is a positive good for society, though we are seeing a small amount of erosion in those numbers. Over the last five years the percentage of people who find marriage “old-fashioned and out-of-date” has grown from 12 percent to 18 percent. Changes in these questions are most pronounced among the youngest Americans. This pattern is bears watching.

While five years ago cultural concerns dominated economic ones as the most important problem facing families, for the past few years that has reversed and economic concerns are now somewhat more likely to be named by respondents. If it is true that the country shifts into a recession in the next couple of years, this will also be a number to scrutinize.

Knowledge of Relationship Trends and Facts

The public is not terribly knowledgeable about some trends in family life. The public believes trends like divorce, teenage sex and resulting pregnancies are all increasing, though the opposite is true. On top of this, the public tends to slightly over estimate how bad any of these trends are at any given time. The public is more likely to correctly identify current trends in the fertility rate, the marriage rate, and the prevalence of single-parent homes.

In general, there are relatively few demographic patterns to this pessimism. For instance the wealthy overestimate about as much as the less wealthy. A partial exception to this is partisanship: Republicans are more pessimistic about trends than are Democrats — though majorities in both groups tend to believe trends are growing worse.

Misguided pessimism about trends in family life is correlated with increased negativity about the overall state of marriages and families. When Americans wrongly perceive the facts of family life, those perceptions color their views of the health of family relationships today.

Attitudes about Family Leave

Americans of many different backgrounds report taking family-related time off from work in recent years. Income does not seem to be a barrier to taking family leave, as similar percentages of low-, middle-, and high-income Americans say they have recently taken at least a week or more of time away for family reasons.

The family leave experience differs substantially by income, however. Low-income workers are far less likely than others to be offered paid leave. When their employers do offer pay, it covers a lower percentage of their typical income. In addition, lower-income workers are less likely to return to the same job at the end of their leave period. In fact, lower-income workers were more likely than others to leave the workforce entirely at the end of their family-related time off. In addition, lower-income workers are more likely to pay for time away from work by relying on family and friends or on savings and debt, whereas higher-income earners rely on their employers to a greater extent.

These income-based trends also appear to have some racial/ethnic implications, as these differences in access to paid leave seem to bear unequally hard on black and Hispanic Americans.

Americans of all different political perspectives are highly supportive of paid time off from work when a new child is born, but there is less agreement about the obligation to provide leave — especially paid leave — in other circumstances. Democrats are more supportive than Republicans of providing paid family leave beyond maternity and paternity leave. They also favor longer periods of leave than do Republicans.

Both Democrats and Republicans agree that paid leave should not cover the entire cost of a worker's typical salary. Support for some level of self-funding or help from family for family-related time off is high, especially for situations beyond maternity and paternity leave.

Of four family leave proposals that are currently being considered in Congress, none were favored by a majority of Americans. Survey respondents were especially pessimistic about proposals to pay for family leave by borrowing against Social Security benefits. In general, Americans opposed both higher taxes and changes to existing entitlement programs in order to pay for family leave. The most popular option for paying for family leave involved tax breaks for companies who voluntarily provide time off for family-related needs.

2 The State of Marriage and Family

There are approximately 3,000 respondents in the 2019 American Family Survey. Of them, a little less than half are married, as Table 1 describes. The balance of that table fills out our demographic picture of marriage by demographic group. About one third of the respondents are not in any sort of relationship. The remaining fifth of respondents are cohabiting or in a relationship (but not cohabiting).

Table 1: Family Status by Demographics

	Married	Cohabiting	In a Relationship	No Relationship
Overall	48	11	7	34
Democrat	39	13	9	39
Independent	40	12	9	40
Republican	63	8	4	24
18-29	23	17	13	47
30-44	55	14	7	25
45-54	50	11	7	32
55-64	55	7	5	34
65+	56	5	3	35
High School or Less	43	11	7	39
Some College	45	13	9	34
College Graduate or More	58	8	6	28
Under \$40,000	29	13	9	49
\$40,000-\$79,999	59	12	5	24
Above \$80,000	59	8	7	26
White	51	11	6	32
Black	31	11	12	46
Hispanic	45	13	8	34
Attends church monthly or more	59	7	6	28
Attends church less than monthly	42	13	8	37

Similar to previous years, marriage has a partisan tilt: a majority of Republicans are married (63 percent), but only a minority of Democrats are (39 percent). It also has an economic tilt: respondents who made less than \$40,000 a year reported being in no relationship at all more often than those who made over \$80,000 a year by more than 20 percentage points. In a related vein, college graduates are the most likely to report being married, while only a minority of those with a high school degree or only some college report marriage. We also see some important differences by church attendance: Americans who report going to church once a month or more are much more likely to be married than those who attend church less frequently. Finally, there are racial differences. White respondents reported being married more often

Table 2: Relationship Status By Year

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Married	52	50	47	47	48
Cohabiting	11	10	11	11	11
In a Relationship	7	7	6	6	7
No Relationship	30	34	35	35	34

than black respondents by 20 percentage points, while Hispanic respondents reported being married more often than Black respondents by about 14 percentage points. These are complex, interrelated phenomena that are highly correlated but the pattern remains the same: marriage is an institution more often entered by the educated, whiter, wealthier, and more religious citizens.¹ Such differences in accessibility could be traced to a variety of reasons, but the marriage divide is a fact of American family life.

The pattern of relationship status over time remains fairly stable, as can be seen in Table 2. We note that there is a slight downward trend in the percent of the population that is married since 2015, but it is not enormous (about four points) and the pattern appears to be fairly stable for the last three years. A similar story is apparent in the slow uptick in the percent of people who are in no relationship of any kind. Compared with 2015, this percentage has risen, but, again, this statistic has remained somewhat stable for the past three years. The partisan nature of the marriage gap is mostly holding steady: the difference between the proportion of Republicans and Democrats who are married increased by only 3 percentage points since 2015. The income gap in the likelihood of being in no relationship is about 5 percentage points wider than what we found in 2015. The marriage gap between the college educated and those with only a high school degree has increased by about 6 percentage points. Other demographic differences have largely held steady or have no clear pattern over time.

¹Though we report the age cohort differences they are largely unchanged relative to previous years and reflect the life cycle differences in marriage rates.

2.1 Evaluations of Marriage

In every year of the American Family Survey, Americans have expressed largely positive views of their own marriage, but concern about the state of marriages more generally in the United States. These trends continued to be evident in 2019, as can be seen in Figure 1. Only a small percentage of respondents said their own marriages had become weaker in the last two years – the remainder were evenly split between evaluating their marriages as staying about the same and feeling that their marriages had become stronger.




Figure 1: The figure shows beliefs about the respondent's own marriage and marriages in the United States generally.

This pattern is almost exactly reversed when asked about marriages generally in the United States. When respondents turned their attention to the state of marriages more broadly, only 9 percent believed that marriages had gotten stronger in the last two years. Thus, Americans appear to be fairly optimistic about the health of their own romantic relationships, but dramatically more pessimistic about the health of marriages generally. The broad outlines of this pattern have held steady over the past five years of the American Family Survey. We do, however, see some small signs that the percentage of Americans believing that marriages generally are growing weaker has declined. In 2015, 40% of respondents believed that marriages generally were growing weaker. By 2019, that number declined to 34%. While the decline has been small but consistent over the past five years, we do not find corresponding increases in the percentage saying that marriages generally are becoming substantially stronger.

People's beliefs about marriage and its qualities also remain relatively stable, but with some signs that the institution may be losing a bit of popularity. Figure 2 shows the trend (or lack of trend) in how people see marriage and its qualities. Generally the four positive statements receive a great deal of support (ranging between about half of the public and over 60 percent). However, there is one item that has declined quite a bit since 2015: the belief that marriage is needed in order to create strong families. In 2015 the number was 62 percent, but it has fallen, especially in the last three years, to only 54 percent. This trend has been accompanied by a similar uptick in the number of people who find marriage old-fashioned and out-of-date, a number which is now almost one-fifth of the population.




Figure 2: The figure shows beliefs about the importance of marriage.

These trends were evident across all age groups, but were especially pronounced among the youngest Americans. In 2015, over half (51%) of respondents age 18-29 agreed that “marriage is needed to create strong families.” By 2019, that number had fallen to 37% — just over one third of the cohort. The percent agreeing with the statement fell among all other age cohorts as well, though the decrease was not as large (between 5 and 10 percentage points). Similarly, the proportion of young people believing that marriage is “old-fashioned and out-of-date” increased by 10 percentage points (from 17% to 27%), though with respect to this question, other age cohorts also increased in their agreement at similar rates (10 percentage points among people age 30-44 and 9 percentage points among people between 45-54). The change was much smaller among Americans over 55.

2.2 Evaluations of the Family

Broadly similar to evaluations of the family, we find that attitudes about one's own family and families in general tend to be stable (see Figure 3). About half of the public thinks the strength of their own family is about the same as in previous years. A similar, but slightly lower number, feels the same about families generally. But there is a distinction between one's family and families generally. About a third of the public sees their own family as getting stronger, while a very similar number see families generally as getting weaker.




Figure 3: The figure shows evaluations of the state of marriage.

As with our questions about marriage, there is a sense of some change with respect to that last point. Though the difference is not yet large, the percentage of the public who believe that families generally are getting weaker is declining from 36 percent in 2015 to 30 percent in 2019. Though it is probably too early to declare this a significant trend (and obviously it could just be a spike in the percentage of those who do not know how to respond to this question) it is possible that concern about families is declining a bit.

2.3 The Practice of Family Life in America

In the first year of the American Family Survey, one of the key findings we highlighted was that while there are partisan and ideological differences in how Americans think about the family, the actual practice of family life was very similar regardless of political identities. We explored how families live by asking respondents to tell us how often (on a 7-point scale ranging from never to daily) their family engages in several different activities: eating dinner together, doing household chores together, attending activities of family members, going out to the movies, museums, sporting events, or parks together, having an argument, and worshipping together.

Table 3 presents the percentage of Democrats and Republicans in the 2019 survey who said their families undertake each of the six activities at least weekly. Numbers in parentheses indicate changes in those percentages relative to 2015.

Table 3: Partisanship and Family Activities

	Democrats	Republicans	All
<i>Eat Dinner Together</i>	81 (+8)	84 (+5)	83 (+7)
<i>Do Household Chores</i>	61 (+3)	66 (+5)	63 (+2)
<i>Attend Family Member Activities</i>	23 (-3)	23 (+1)	22 (-1)
<i>Go Out to Movies, Other Events</i>	29 (+3)	25 (+2)	26 (+3)
<i>Worship Together</i>	26 (-6)	45 (+6)	35 (+1)
<i>Have an Argument</i>	24 (+4)	24 (+11)	24 (+7)

As in our 2015 survey, we again find that the lived experience of family life is not highly correlated with respondents' political identities. Similar (and sometimes perfectly identical) percentages of Democrats and Republicans said they eat dinner together, do household chores together, attend family members' activities, go out together, and have arguments at least weekly. Though there has been some change in the frequency of these activities since 2015, these changes tend to be small to moderate in size and often have the effect of further narrowing partisan differences.

The exception to this story of partisan similarity is religious worship. Not only are the differences between Republicans and Democrats substantial — nearly 20 percentage points — but partisans appear to have moved sharply in the opposite direction from each other since 2015. In the initial year of our study, the difference between partisans was only 8 percentage points. Since then, Democrats declined by 6 percentage points, while Republicans moved in the opposite direction by the same amount. Many features of family

life are common to both Democrats and Republicans, but attendance at worship services is, increasingly, not one of them.

2.4 The Most Important Problems Facing Families

Figure 4 follows up on another question we have asked since 2015: what is the most important problem facing families today? Respondents were given a curated list of twelve items and could choose up to three. The response options (as can be seen in Table 4 and in the topline in the appendix) are a collection of issues that we have categorized into a set of structural, economic, and cultural issues. As the figure makes clear, though there is much stability in this trend, we are beginning to see some changes. While it has always been true that the structural issues that have faced families have been most important, this has declined slightly in the most recent year, and the trend of economic factors growing in importance since 2015 remains. For the average person, economic issues garner slightly more support as the key set of issues than do the cultural issues.




Figure 4: The figure shows trends in the importance of problems that face families.

When we examine each of the measures that make up these categories, we find that Americans feel increasing concerns about the costs of raising a family, high work demands, and stress on parents, and

Table 4: Most Important Problems Facing Families

	% Selecting	Change from 2015
Economics	61	+12
<i>The cost associated with raising a family</i>	35	+9
<i>High work demands and stress on parents</i>	29	+8
<i>The lack of good jobs</i>	16	-3
<i>Lack of government programs to support family</i>	15	+7
Culture	56	-12
<i>Decline in religious faith and church attendance</i>	23	0
<i>The widespread availability and use of drugs and alcohol</i>	19	-8
<i>Sexual permissiveness in our society</i>	14	-11
<i>Crime and other threats to personal safety</i>	17	-2
Family Structure and Stability	72	-8
<i>Parents not teaching or disciplining their children sufficiently</i>	45	-8
<i>More children growing up in single-parents homes</i>	24	-1
<i>Difficulty finding quality time with family in digital age</i>	20	-1
<i>Change in the definition of marriage and family</i>	14	-2

the lack of government programs to support families. People appear to feel less concern about the lack of good jobs, which suggests that worries about economic challenges facing families could continue to increase if the economy were to move toward a recession. This is the first year that U.S. economy has shown signs of impending economic distress since the survey began. As we head into possible economic distress, it will be important to keep an eye on where these trends head since it could be the case that the trend lines will move again in response to the changing state of the economy.

Table 4 also shows that the decline in concerns about cultural issues is tied to decreasing worries about drugs and alcohol and about sexual permissiveness. In addition, Americans appear less concerned about how other parents are disciplining their children than they were in previous iterations of the survey.

3 Knowledge of Family Trends in America

How much does the public know about family and family life in America today? To test this question we asked the public whether they believed seven trends were getting more or less prevalent over time. To make the job manageable for respondents, we asked only about the last ten years — a relatively recent period that represents something close to a census cycle. Respondents were randomly assigned to answer questions about four of the trends, and for each they indicated whether the trend had increased, decreased, or stayed about the same in the past decade. Table 5 describes each of the items we examined as well as documentation for the broad trends.

Table 5: Trends in American Family Life

Demographic Trend	Correct Answer
Divorce rate	Clearly decreasing ²
Teenage sexual activity	Clearly decreasing ³
Births outside of marriage	Either decreasing or staying about the same ⁴
Teen pregnancy	Clearly decreasing ⁵
Fertility rate	Either staying about the same or decreasing very slightly ⁶
Marriage rate	Either decreasing or staying about the same ⁷
Single parent homes	Either increasing or staying about the same ⁸

Does the American public have an accurate view? Figure 5 displays the percentage of the public that got each trend *wrong*.⁹ The percentages are striking. Almost nine in ten people believe that the divorce rate is getting worse when it is not. Similarly, about eight out of ten people believe the same thing about teenage sex. The numbers for births outside of marriage and teen pregnancies (by which we mean births to teens) are slightly lower. Only one out of every six people believes that these trends are going up while they are actually either stable or decreasing.

Americans have a more accurate perception of fertility rates, marriage rate and single-parent homes. There

²The CDC reports that in 2007 there were 3.6 divorces per 1000 people. The number in 2017 was 2.9. The trend is also downward when we analyze divorce rates among married people, according to the National Center for Health Statistics.

³The Center For Disease Control reports that in 2007 48 percent of high school students reported ever having sex. In 2017 the comparable number was 40 percent.

⁴The American Community Survey notes that in 2017 about 34 percent of births fit this category, about the same as a decade earlier, though perhaps slightly lower.

⁵In 2006 the CDC reports 40 such births per 1,000 women ages 15 - 19, while in 2016 the number was only 20.3.

⁶The World Bank has the total fertility rate as being 1.8 in 2016. This is down from 2.0 only a few years earlier, but not down a great deal.

⁷The CDC reports that in 2007 there were 7.3 marriages per 1000 people. In 2017 the number was slightly lower at 6.9.

⁸On the American Community Survey the number of single parent families in 2008 was 32 percent, while it was 34 percent in 2017.

⁹For certain trends we counted two answers as correct. For instance, regarding divorce the answer is clearly that the rate is declining, for births outside of marriage the correct answer is either up slightly or about the same. We considered either of those options “correct” and focused on those who got it wrong. Our aim was to be as generous as possible in counting the number of correct responses.




Figure 5: The figure shows the percentage of people who incorrectly labelled each of these trends as either getting worse, getting better or staying the same.

they tend to know that these are either flat or decreasing. But note that in each of these cases the more “pessimistic” answer happens to be correct (though, of course, this depends in part on one’s perspective and values). Thus, Americans tend to assume that things are getting worse, even in cases where that pessimism is not warranted.

Given these patterns, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, at least with respect to some important elements of family life in the United States, Americans are a gloomy lot unable to look beyond negative sensationalizing or to distinguish between what has improved and what has not. While reasonable people can disagree about the normative implications of these trends, the public appears not to have recognized that rates of divorce rate, teenage sexual activity, and births outside of marriage are declining or holding steady. In this sense, large percentages of Americans have an exaggerated view of how bad family life is in the United States.

We also find evidence of a small but significant partisan difference in this negativity: Republicans are *more* pessimistic than are Democrats. Figure 6 illustrates this by breaking down the results in Figure 5 by

partisanship. Republicans are consistently the group that sees these trends as becoming more and more common. We do not want to overstate the differences. For instance, though nine in ten Republicans think teenage sex is becoming more common, but the comparable number for Democrats is only about seven out of ten. And for teenage pregnancies the differences are, respectively, seven out of ten against five out of ten.




Figure 6: The figure shows the percentage of people who incorrectly labelled each of these trends as either getting worse, getting better or staying the same, but labelled by partisan differences.

What the reader should note is that even these differences do not obscure a key pattern: most people, regardless of partisanship, see relatively negative trends. A majority of Democrats hold views that are similar to a majority of Republicans. It is just that the Democratic majorities are somewhat smaller. Still, there is a very consistent pattern for the four items where the public is particularly pessimistic: divorces, teen sex, births out of marriage, and teen pregnancies. Republicans are more pessimistic on each of those measures.

We also asked respondents to guess the actual rates for each of these trends. By and large, this way of assessing public knowledge gave us relatively little information. People gave a wide range of responses.

For instance, Figure 7 displays a density of the percentage of births outside of marriage that people believed were happening. The correct answer (for today) is indicated by a red bar in the figure, and to help illustrate how little demographic differences we observed the chart also includes the answers by income. There were tiny, largely insignificant differences reported by various demographic groups. In general, there was a strong tendency to overestimate the rate (at least for some of the items, especially in cases where it was simple to translate the guesses into percentages or rates).




Figure 7: The figure shows the distribution of responses to the rate of births outside of marriage with the correct answer (labelled in red) and then broken out by income category along with the overall mean response.

Does public knowledge of these rates differ by demographics? Largely, no. We found relatively few such examples. For instance, The average respondent believed that about 47 percent of births occur out of wedlock. Income groups varied around that belief (as can be seen in Figure 7) but not widely—the lowest income group gave 51 as the rate, while the highest income group gave 43, a statistically significant difference, but not a large substantive difference. The pattern on other issues was generally similar, though sometimes higher educated respondents were closer to the correct answer than were those with less education.

What should we make of this negative outlook? The most obvious connection is to the percentage of people who see the American Family as being in decline. In the section summarizing the core findings above, we concluded that most Americans either see marriage and the family as being about the same as in the past, or as being somewhat worse. The data in this section provide context for those beliefs.

It is logical to believe that the American family is in decline if you also believe that divorce is rising, more children than ever are being born outside of marriage, and teenagers increasingly have sex and get pregnant.

Of course, those are misplaced perceptions that put the American family in a much more negative light than is warranted. The 2019 American Family Survey allows us to show how these misperceptions are correlated with negative judgments about the family. For example, approximately 60% of Americans wrongly believed that the rate of births outside of marriage is increasing. Those who misperceived this trend were significantly more likely to believe that marriages in the United States are generally getting worse. Specifically, about 41% of those who were wrong about the rate of out-of-wedlock births thought that marriages were getting worse, compared to 22% of those who knew the correct state of the trend in births outside of marriage. Similarly, those who got the births outside of marriage question wrong were about 16 percentage points more likely to believe that families in the United States are generally getting worse. These results hold even when we use more sophisticated statistical techniques to control for partisanship and other demographic characteristics.

Similar trends can be seen with respect to other aspects of knowledge about the family. Table 6 shows the relationship between misperception of trends and pessimism about the state of American marriages with respect to three facts most Americans tend to get wrong. As discussed above, in the cases of divorce, teen sexual activity, and births outside of marriage, most Americans assume that the trend lines are getting worse (more divorce, more teen sexual activity, and more births outside of marriage), but in all three cases, the actual trends are either flat or moving in the other direction. Cell entries in Table 6 highlight the percentage of respondents who reported that marriage in the United States is getting weaker by their knowledge of each of these trends. In every case, misperceiving recent trends was associated with increasing likelihood of believing that marriage is getting weaker.

Table 6: Pessimism about Marriages Generally
by Knowledge of Family Trends

<i>Percent Who Say U.S. Marriages Getting Weaker if</i>			
<i>Trend Question Answered</i>	<i>Correctly</i>	<i>Incorrectly</i>	<i>Difference</i>
Divorce Rate	27	34	-7
Teen Sexual Activity	25	37	-12
Births Outside Marriage	22	41	-19

Notably, misperceiving the trend in births outside of marriage or divorce rate or teen sexual activity had no negative relationship with Americans' beliefs about their *own* marriages. If anything, those who did not know the trends felt better about their own family relationships. Perhaps this helps explain one of our project's most consistent findings: that Americans are quite happy with their own marriages and families even though they are much more worried about everyone else's families. Misperceiving the actual facts of family life in America today — especially when their judgments are more negative than is warranted — is correlated with pessimistic summary assessments about marriages and families.

4 Family Leave Policy

In the 2019 American Family Survey, we asked respondents to tell us about their experiences with family leave, which we defined for them as taking a week or more off from work for family-related reasons. As we detail below, family leave is a common experience — people of widely different backgrounds and demographic characteristics reported taking extended time away to deal with family-related issues of various kinds. However, the support received from employers for various types of leave varied significantly by both income and race/ethnicity. While the need for leave is widely felt, employer support for those taking leave is unequally distributed.

In addition, we also explored public assessments of paid family leave policy proposals currently being debated in Congress. We find that the public has not coalesced around any single policy proposal at this point. While most Americans agree that paid maternity leave is a good idea, they are more divided on who should be responsible to cover the cost of such time away from work and whether paid leave should be extended to other common family needs.

4.1 *Experiences with Family Leave*

Our focus was on family leave of at least one week or more sometime in the past five years. Overall, about 15% of the sample reported taking leave that met those criteria, but if we remove those for whom the question was not applicable (largely because they were retired or otherwise out of the workforce), that number rises to 22%.¹⁰ Given that we restricted the window to leaves taken only in the past five years, the fact that more than 1/5 of the sample had taken leave is notable.

We find no large differences by gender (21.4% of men vs. 23.3% of women) or by partisanship (21.4% of Democrats vs. 24.7% of Republicans). Young people are more likely than older age cohorts to take leave, with family leave being especially common among those between the ages of 30-44, which coincide with the years in which many Americans are parenting young children.

In follow-up questions, we also asked respondents to tell us the purpose of their leave time. For both men and women, the most common was maternity and paternity leave, though women were slightly more likely than men to choose this category, as can be seen in Table 7. For men, care of spouse came second, followed by other leave types, the care of a child, and care for elderly parents. Women were slightly more likely to report taking leave in order to care for a child or parents than to care for a spouse. In open-ended responses, survey participants indicated that the “other” category captured a diverse set of circumstances, including the death of family members, personal medical needs, and emotional or mental health challenges.

Among those who told us they had taken family leave in the past five years, the average time away from work was a little over 2 months (2.2). Women reported longer average leaves than men (2.7 months vs.

¹⁰In the analyses that follow, we remove those who told us family leave was not applicable to them.

Table 7: Types of Family Leave

	Men	Women
Maternity/Paternity	23	28
Care of Spouse	19	10
Care of Child	17	17
Care of Aged Parents	15	17
Care of Other Family	4	6
Care of Friend	4	1
Other	18	21

1.7 months). Thus, although both men and women took leave at similar rates, women tended to be away from the workplace slightly longer. Average leave times are skewed by a few outliers who took leave last a year or more. But even if we focus on the median leave time instead of the mean, women's leaves tended to be longer (1 month) than men's (2 weeks).

As Figure 8 shows, low-, middle-, and high-income respondents reported taking leave at approximately similar rates. Across all three income categories, a little over 1/5 of Americans said they had taken leave of at least a week or more. It appears that income is not a barrier to taking time away from work to deal with family-related issues. Given that the federal Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA), requires employers with 50 or more employees to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid maternity leave, federal policy no doubt plays at least some role in this equal access to leave.

But the fact that Americans of all income categories take leave should not obscure the ways socio-economic status matters for the types of leave offered and for Americans' experiences during and after their leaves. For example, Figure 8 shows that only 37% of low-income respondents who took leave were offered pay by their employers, compared to 48% of middle-income and 64% of high-income Americans. Relatedly, men were significantly more likely than women (57% vs. 45%) to receive paid leave, and college graduates were also more likely to receive income from their employers while taking time away for family reasons. Thus, although men and women, rich and poor took leaves at similar rates, paid family leave was highly unequally distributed.

Not only were low-income Americans less likely to benefit from paid leave, but they also received less support overall to finance their leaves. We also asked respondents to tell us what percentage of their typical income was covered during the period of their leave, counting both pay from employers and help from government programs. Respondents told us that on average, they received about 72% of their typical income while they were away from work. Men received more than women (76% vs. 68%), and we also find substantial differences across income categories. Again, Figure 8 highlights the basic trends. Low income respondents reported receiving about 62% of their typical income while away on leave, compared to 74% for middle income and 77% for high income respondents. These results include all sources of income, whether from the employer, government programs, or elsewhere. In general, Americans make do




Figure 8: Leave Experiences by Respondent Income

with less while taking time off for family, but low-income Americans — who, by definition, earn less to begin with — receive the least support.

In addition, there are significant income and racial/ethnic differences in the ability of leave-takers to continue their job or career trajectory after the conclusion of their family leave. Low income respondents were significantly less likely than those at the middle or upper income to return to the same job at the same company at the end of their leave. Only 62% of low income respondents returned to the same job at the same company, compared to 80% of middle-income and 83% of high-income respondents. Lower-income respondents were dramatically more likely to leave the workforce at the end of their leaves (16% vs. 6% or 4%). These income differences also appear to be linked to race and ethnicity because 83% of White respondents returned to the same job they left, compared to 67% of Black respondents and 63% of Hispanic respondents.

When they take family-related leave, how do Americans pay for their time off from work? We asked respondents, for example, to indicate whether they had made use of any local, state, or national government programs during the period of their leave. About 30% of respondents said that they supplemented their

Table 8: Types of Government Support Used

	Men	Women
Short-Term Disability Insurance	41	31
Food Stamps	58	52
Housing Assistance	20	25
Unemployment Insurance	8	8
Other	11	12

incomes with some sort of government resources, and as Table 8 highlights, of those who reported using a government program, food stamps were the most common. Men were more likely than women (35% vs. 26%) to say they had used any government programs, and perhaps surprisingly, Republicans (35%) were slightly more likely than Democrats (28%) or Independents (23%) to report government support. In addition, middle-income Americans were substantially less likely (24%) to say they had benefitted from a government program during their family leave than were low- (32%) or high-income (33%) respondents. Though more remains to be done to explore this finding, these results may offer some initial evidence that when it comes to government support for family-related time off from work, it is the middle class that is being left behind.

As a way of uncovering a more complete picture of how Americans financed family leave, we asked respondents who took leave to estimate what percentage of their financial support while away from work came from different sources. In other words, regardless of income, how did these different sources contribute to total support received? Categories of support included the respondent's employer, family and friends, government program, self (including savings or credit card debt), and other. Respondents indicated a percentage for each source, with the total adding up to 100%.

Figure 9 shows the results by income category. It is clear that the poor and the well-to-do financed their family leaves differently. For those with low levels of income, only 18% of their leave income was covered by their employers, while the vast majority of support came from personal savings or debt (36%) and family and friends (22%). By contrast, wealthy leave takers received a much larger portion of their income from their employers (40%), followed by self-financing (30%), with family and friends lagging farther behind (15%). Notably, the differences between wealthy and poor in the proportion of support coming from government programs is small.

We also asked those who did *not* report taking a leave in the past 5 years if they had confronted any situations in which they wanted to take paid family leave, but could not because it was not available. Note that this is likely to be an underestimate of the total number who wanted paid leave because we restricted the question only to those who told us they had not taken any leave (paid or unpaid). Overall, about 10% of respondents who saw the question told us that they wanted paid leave but were unable to take it. Those percentages do not differ much by gender or education, though there are other differences. Democrats and Independents (12%) were slightly more likely to say that they wanted paid leave than were




Figure 9: Sources of Funding by Respondent Income

Republicans (8%), and younger people were more likely than older respondents to say that they wanted leave but that it was not available to them. Once again, we also find evidence of clear income differences. Respondents with incomes under \$40,000 were about twice as likely as those with incomes above \$80,000 to say that they did not have access to paid leave (13% vs. 7%). Blacks and Hispanics were also more likely than Whites (14% and 15% vs. 8%) to say that they did not have access to paid leave but wanted it.

Overall, these results underscore the clear finding that family leave is more of a burden for those at the lower end of the income spectrum in the United States today. Though poorer Americans take family-related time off from work at similar rates to wealthier people, they receive less support from their employers, both in terms of the likelihood of receiving any pay at all and for those who are paid, the amount of pay received. This means that for poorer Americans, a greater portion of leave must be self-financed or come from family and friends. In addition, a smaller percentage of the working poor is able to return to the job they left at the conclusion of their leave, while wealthier Americans seem to have an easier time continuing their career trajectories, even after taking temporary time off to deal with family issues.

4.2 Attitudes about Family Leave

In addition to asking respondents to report about their own experiences with family leave, we also inquired about their preferences for public policies regarding paid leave more generally. Unlike the income-based differences we reported above, policy preferences differed primarily by partisanship. Differences in policy preferences by income tended to be much smaller.

We first asked who should be responsible, in principle, for covering the costs of different types of family leave. Respondents could indicate the government, employers, or the individual and their families. They could check more than one alternative if they preferred. Table 9 presents the percentage of respondents selecting each source of leave funding. Not surprisingly, Democrats were more supportive of government-funded leave than were Republicans, and Republicans tended to prefer that individuals cover the cost of time off from work themselves. But even among Democrats, we do not find evidence that large majorities prefer government-funded leave. At the same time, both Democrats and Republicans agreed that employers should shoulder the cost of maternity leave. Two-thirds of Democrats and over half of Republicans said that employers should be responsible for paying mothers who take time off from work for the birth of a child. Nearly that same number of Democratic respondents also saw paternity leave as the responsibility of the employer, while just under half of Republicans said that employers should cover these costs, with just over half of Republicans agreeing that fathers should cover those costs themselves.

At the same time, very large percentages of both Democrats and Republicans responded that family leave for other reasons — the care of a child, care of adult family members, care of friends or neighbors, and other personal reasons — should be at least partially covered by the individual taking leave or that individual's family. Americans appear to want employers to provide maternity and paternity leave, but they are less certain that employers or the government have the primary responsibility to pay employees who take time off to care for family responsibilities.

Table 9: Who Should Cover the Cost of Family Leave?

	Democrats			Republicans		
	Government	Employers	Self/Family	Government	Employers	Self/Family
Maternity Leave	35	67	19	15	54	42
Paternity Leave	32	64	23	10	47	51
Care of Child	29	25	68	8	16	85
Care of Adult Family	43	19	60	15	12	83
Care of Friend/Neighbor	31	12	70	16	10	79
Other Personal Reasons	20	22	75	9	14	83

These results may indicate that Americans are not particularly enamored of paid time off for family-related reasons outside of maternity and perhaps paternity leave. But we also probed the issue of paid leave in other ways as well, and the patterns that emerged were slightly different. For example, we asked respondents to imagine a world in which Congress were to pass laws mandating paid family leave.

(We did not indicate whether the government or the employer would cover that cost.) We then asked respondents to indicate whether individuals in various circumstances should be eligible for paid time off. Figure 10 presents the results.




Figure 10: Public Preferences about Eligibility for Paid Leave by Partisanship

When asked to assume congressional action to ensure paid family leave, between 7 and 8 in 10 Democrats responded that mothers and fathers at the birth of a child, caregivers of sick children, and caregivers of adult family members should be eligible to be paid. Majorities of independents also felt that maternity and paternity leave and time off to care for a sick child should be eligible for pay, with just under half independents also supporting paid leave to care for adult family members. Among Republicans, only maternity leave received majority support, and about one-third of Republicans said that no one should be eligible for paid family leave, no matter what the circumstance. In addition, support for leave in other circumstances — to care for a friend or for other reasons that employees could decide — was significantly lower among all groups.

Across both approaches to the question, a majority of Americans supported paid leave in the case of maternity and paternity leave. In both ways of asking the question, support for paid leave was lower for other circumstances, such as care of friends or neighbors. In the cases of caring for a child or adult family

members, support for paid leave appears to hinge at least partly on the way the question is asked. And even when pay is available from either the government or the employer, many Americans also believe that people taking leave should contribute some of the cost, too.

In addition, we asked respondents how much of workers' typical salary should be covered when they take time off for paid leave. Responses to this question also underscore the notion that Americans prefer workers contribute financially toward time off for family leave. On average, survey respondents said that about 70% of an employee's normal salary should be covered. Democrats preferred that paid leave should cover 73% of a worker's salary, while Republicans came in a little lower at 64%.

As with the questions about eligibility for paid leave, Americans also distinguished between different circumstances in terms of their preferences about the length of paid leave periods. For this question, respondents were again asked to assume that Congress had mandated paid family leave and could then indicate how long the paid leave should be in various circumstances. Respondents were also allowed to indicate "none" if they thought that paid leave should not be an option in a given circumstance. As a point of comparison, the current federal Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) mandates that employers with more than 50 employees provide up to three months (12 weeks) of unpaid time off for maternity leave.




Figure 11: Preferred Length of Paid Leave by Partisanship

Results can be seen in Figure 11. Americans generally supported longer leaves in cases of maternity and paternity leave and the need to care for sick family members. In each of those cases, preferred leaves were substantially longer than for time off to care for a friend or for other reasons that the employee might decide. In the cases of maternity and paternity leave or care for sick children or adults, Democrats tended to prefer much longer leave times than did Republicans, though even Republicans supported leaves of two months or longer in the cases of maternity leave or caring for sick children or adult family members. All groups also preferred longer leave times for mothers than for fathers after the birth of a new child.

Though the specifics of the question matter, we see strong evidence that Americans are highly supportive of paid maternity and paternity leave and that they are somewhat more skeptical about paid leave to care for friends or neighbors. Republicans and Democrats differ in their levels of support for mandated paid leave to deal with other issues, such as caring for a sick child or adult family members. At the same time, even supporters of paid leave in those circumstances also see a role for individuals to contribute to their own support when they take time off from work for family-related reasons.

4.3 Support for Family Leave Policies

In the 2019 AFS, we also asked respondents to consider several actual family leave proposals that were being considered at the time the survey was fielded. We focused on four different policies: the CRADLE Act proposed by Republicans Mike Lee and Joni Ernst; the New Parents Act, supported by Republican Mitt Romney; the FAMILY Act sponsored by Democrat Rosa DeLauro; and the Working Parents Flexibility Act proposed by Republican John Katko. Details of each of these policy proposals can be found in Table 10. For each bill or proposal, we provided information to the respondents about who would be eligible for leave, how long the leave could be, how much salary would be replaced, and how the leave would be paid for. Each respondent saw information about two randomly selected policy proposals, and respondents indicated how much they supported for opposed each of the two proposals. Importantly, the names and sponsors of each proposal were not included in the information seen by survey respondents.

Figure 12 presents levels of support for each proposal by partisanship. The key finding is that none of the policy proposals received anything close to majority support. This could be for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the proposals are not yet well known and have not been the subject of sustained public campaigns to garner backing. Republicans appear to be especially skeptical of attempts to provide paid leave. The CRADLE Act and the New Parents Act, both of which have Republican sponsors, receive more support from Democrats than from Republicans. The plan that received the most Republican support — the Working Parents Flexibility Act — is a proposal for tax exemptions for personal parental savings accounts that could be used to defray the cost of family leave, not for paid leave provided by either the government or employers. Support for that proposal is consistent with the notion that many Americans believe that workers should pay for at least part of the cost of family leave out of their own pockets.

The only proposal favored by a majority of Democrats was Rosa DeLauro's FAMILY Act, which provides 2/3 of worker salary for up to three months for a variety of different family medical issues. Notably, this

Table 10: Family Leave Policy Proposals

	Who can take leave?	How long can it be?	How much salary is replaced?	How is it paid for?
Policy 1: CRADLE Act Mike Lee and Joni Ernst (GOP)	Parents at the birth or adoption of a child	Up to 3 months	Up to 100% of wages depending on income, with lower income families receiving a higher percentage	Use Social Security funds, then delay Social Security retirement benefits by 2 months for every month of paid leave
Policy 2: New Parents Act Mitt Romney (GOP)	Parents at the birth or adoption of a child	Up to 3 months	From 33% - 110% with those who make less receiving more. Salary replacement is decreased the longer the leave.	Use Social Security funds, then an increase in taxes or delay retirement age to repay Social Security
Policy 3: FAMILY Act Rosa DeLauro (Dem)	Parents at the birth or adoption of a child, family caregivers, and individuals having a medical procedure	Up to 3 months	66% of salary	Tax that is estimated to be 2 cents per \$10 wages
Policy 4: Working Parents Flexibility Act John Katko (GOP)	Any parents or potential parents who save enough money to fund a period of leave	Determined by the amount of money saved	Depends on the amount saved through a tax exempt personal parental savings account	Tax exemption for personal parental savings accounts




Figure 12: Support for Current Policy Proposals by Partisanship

proposal was also embraced by 35% of Republicans, which is slightly higher than the level of Republican support for both the CRADLE and New Parents Act. Both of those Republican-backed proposals involve using Social Security funds to pay for family leave, then delaying retirement to offset the costs. At a different point in the survey, we also asked a direct question about funding paid family leave by borrowing against Social Security benefits. It turns out that such a plan is extremely unpopular among Democrats, Republicans, and independents alike. Among all three groups, less than 30% of respondents expressed support, and less than 8% expressed strong support. At this point, at least, most Americans do not want to alter existing entitlement programs to provide paid family leave.

Finally, we also asked respondents how government-funded paid family leave should be paid for, if Congress were to pass such a program. We gave respondents several different potential options, nearly all of which have been discussed in connection with various leave proposals being considered in Washington, DC. Respondents could check as many options as they preferred or, alternatively, choose none of them.

In response to this question, we again found very low levels of support for using Social Security to fund family leave, but even less support for income taxes, payroll taxes, and deficit spending (see Figure 13). Personal savings tax exemptions of the kind proposed by the Working Parents Flexibility Act were




Figure 13: Support for Funding Options by Partisanship

embraced by about 1/3 of our sample. The clear impression left by this pattern is that most people were not enthusiastic about any of these spending options.

The only approach favored by a majority of Democrats and independents was a tax credit to employers who would voluntarily opt in and who would receive the credit when they offer paid leave to their employees. This option was also preferred by 44% of Republicans — more than any other policy proposal. One interpretation of these results is that Americans of all stripes oppose dramatic increases in taxes to pay for a government-provided family leave program, and they resolutely resist tapping into existing entitlement programs to provide family leave. To the extent that the government supports family leave, they prefer that it do so by incentivizing the behavior of employers, not by creating large new programs or altering existing ones.

5 Conclusions

Now in its fifth year, the 2019 American Family Survey reveals a great deal of consistency with previous iterations of the survey. It is not the case that the American family is in steep decline, or that it is achieving new highs, though American marriages and families face meaningful stresses. We see some evidence of increasing skepticism about whether marriage is needed and some initial hints that views of marriage being “old-fashioned and out-of-date” are on the rise. At the same time, most people have positive views of their own marriages and families and feel that marriage is a benefit for children. In addition, this year’s survey also allows us to show that misperceptions about the trends in American family life is widespread. Importantly, believing that those trends are moving in the wrong direction when they are not is correlated with greater pessimism about marriages and families more generally. Misperceptions about the trends in family life are greater among Republicans than among Democrats, though majorities of both groups wrongly perceive trends in the divorce rate, teen sex and pregnancy, and the rate of births outside of marriage. What is more, the day-to-day lives of families in the United States seem to be very similar across lines of political difference. Though Republicans are more likely than Democrats to be married, both groups report similar frequencies of eating dinner together, doing household chores, attending activities, or even arguing with each other. The exception is the prevalence of worshipping together, which is far more common among Republican families than Democratic families.

We continue to find that economic challenges are seen as a burden to families. These concerns are not so much about the availability of good jobs, but instead about the costs associated with raising a family, the stresses that accompany work and career, and the lack of government programs that support the family. Concern about all of these challenges has increased since 2015. In addition, we see socio-economic differences in the tendency to get married: marriage seems to be more accessible for educated, whiter, and wealthier citizens. Socio-economic differences also make themselves felt in the experience of taking time off from work for family-related reasons. While both rich and poor Americans take leave at similar rates, less wealthy Americans are less likely to have access to paid leave, are likely to receive a lower percentage of their regular salary when they do take leave, and are less likely to continue the job and career track they were on when their leave is concluded. A much greater proportion of the cost of leave is funded by the employers of wealthier workers, while people with lower incomes tend to finance their leaves by themselves or with the help of family and friends. Thus, when family needs arise, the economic stresses of family life bear unequally hard on rich and poor workers.

While Americans express concern about the need for government programs that support families, there is no consensus yet at this point about the right way to ensure paid family leave. Most people seem to be supportive of paid leave for the birth of a new child (especially for mothers), but there is less agreement about whether paid leave should be provided in other circumstances, such as for caregivers of sick children or adult family members. Democrats seem more supportive of offering paid leave in a wider range of family-related circumstances, though the level of support depends to some extent on how we ask the question. In addition, none of the specific policy proposals we asked about achieve majority support. To the extent that we can find pools of support for some principles, it is that workers should

probably contribute some portion of the funding needed for family leave. Americans are not enthusiastic about creating large new government programs to promote paid family leave or about altering existing entitlement programs, such as Social Security. Tax incentives for employers to provide leave to their own workers appear to be relatively more popular.

Family relationships remain one of the most important sources of meaning and happiness for most Americans, and for this reason alone, the effort to identify and understand the stresses and challenges faced by couples and families is worth our sustained attention. It is our aim to continue to study this institution and how it relates to politics and policy in America.

6 Appendix: Statement on Methodology

YouGov interviewed 3,244 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 3,000 to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file).

The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.

The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 Presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the final weight.

7 Appendix: Topline Report

What follows is a topline report of all survey questions asked in the 2019 American Family Survey. This topline report was generated by YouGov. Any questions about the survey or the topline should be directed to BYU's Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (csed@byu.edu).